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NOTES
THE ACCUSED'S BAD CHARACTER:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
David Culberg*
[T] her can be no great smoke arise, but ther must be some fire, no
great reporte without great suspition.
-John Lyly'
INTRODUCTION
Propensity character evidence has long been a source of conster-
nation for jurists and policymakers in the United States and the
United Kingdom. The two systems have struggled to strike an appro-
priate balance between the relevant nature of such evidence and its
prejudicial effects. Until the twenty-first century, both systems had set-
tled upon an exclusionary approach: all propensity character evidence
as such was considered inadmissible. However, the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 radically altered this landscape in making British character
law inclusionary: it now allows prosecutors to adduce evidence of a
defendant's bad character provided it passes through one of seven
gateways. 2 While the particulars will be addressed later in this Note,3
suffice it to say that the Act broadly expanded the role of character
evidence in criminal prosecutions, as compared to previous British law
and current law in the United States. However, a closer look indicates
that United States law, in practice, already provides plenty of methods
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., English and
American Literature, Brandeis University, 2005. Special thanks to Professor Geoffrey
Bennett, for the height of his shoulders and the protection of his wing. And to
Professor Jane Simon, who taught me how to write.
1 JOHN LYLY, EupHues: THE ANATOMY OF WIT 31 (1579), reprinted inJOHN LvLv,
EUPHUES 153 (Edward Arber ed., A. Constable & Co. 1895) (1581).
2 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101.
3 See infra Part I.B.
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for a competent prosecutor to introduce any piece of propensity char-
acter evidence she wishes. In this sense, Britain's recent inclusionary
bad character law may be only nominally different from the exclusion-
ary counterpart that the United States has been utilizing all along.
This Note argues that the Criminal Justice Act, with its subse-
quent revisions, sets forth the best statutory approach to the issue of
bad character evidence in criminal prosecutions. However, that is not
to say that the British approach is superior. Indeed, the flexibility that
inheres in the U.S. system has allowed it to evolve into a body of law
that mirrors the British law under the Criminal Justice Act, despite
statutory language that would suggest otherwise. Part I will establish a
baseline, providing a factual overview of the statutory differences
between American and British bad character evidence law. Part II will
examine the most common justifications for the United States' osten-
sibly exclusionary approach to evidence of the accused's bad charac-
ter and will indicate that the better approach would be one of
inclusion. Part III concludes that in practice, the United States is
already there, through use and misuse of Federal Rule 404(b). Part
IV considers recent changes relating to an accused's character evi-
dence in relation to rape and child molestation and points out that
the legal changes have not led to changes in practice or results. It also
underscores the futility of restricting the legal changes to such a small
portion of criminal law. In light of the "true" state of American char-
acter evidence, Part V concludes that the Criminal Justice Act could
almost as easily be a description of U.S. law as a proclamation of Brit-
ish law. All told, the United States, whose approach is only nominally
different from the British approach, reaches the best compromise pos-
sible in its propensity character evidence scheme.
I. THE LAW
The United States, through Federal Rule of Evidence 404, disal-
lows all propensity character evidence as such. 4 Britain, however, with
the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, generally allows such evidence. 5 The
details of the United States and British approaches to evidence of the
accused's bad character will here be addressed in this Part.
The starting point for any analysis of U.S. evidence law is Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, a general rule applicable to all forms of evi-
dence. 6 It mandates that a judge weigh the probative value of any
4 FED. R. EVID. 404.
5 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 101.
6 FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
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piece of evidence against factors such as the danger of unfairly preju-
dicing a jury, confusing the jury as to the issues of the case, overtly
misleading the jury, or inhibiting the speedy and smooth flow of a
trial. 7
Rule 404 is the first rule to directly address the admissibility of
character evidence. 8 The Rule is bifurcated into subparts. Rule
404(a) establishes a general rule of exclusion: character evidence of
the accused is not admissible, save two exceptions. First, an accused
may introduce character evidence about herself.9 Second, evidence of
the accused's character may be admitted by the prosecution as rebut-
tal. 10 Therefore, Rule 404(a) does not provide a mechanism for the
prosecutor to proactively introduce evidence of the accused's bad
character.
It is the Rule's second part, 404(b), where nuance emerges. The
Rule begins by reiterating that prior crimes, wrongs, or acts cannot be
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
7 Id.
8 Rule 404 states:
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in con-
formity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused.-In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same ....
(2) Character of alleged victim.-In a criminal case, and subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evi-
dence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.-Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide rea-
sonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
9 Id. 404(a) (1).
10 Id. 404(b).
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admitted as character evidence. 1 However, the Rule provides that
prior crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for "other purposes,"
such as proving identity, motive, plan, or knowledge. 12 While the
actual use of Rule 404(b) will be explored later in this Note, 13 the
language of the law reveals a policy judgment that, despite the inher-
ent dangers of character evidence, such evidence may be admitted if it
is not introduced to establish a propensity chain of inferences.
There is, however, a section of the Federal Rules of Evidence that
allows prosecutors to introduce evidence of an accused's bad charac-
ter to prove a propensity to act in conformity with previous bad acts.
Rules 413, 414, and 415 were signed into law by President Bill Clinton
in 1995 and took effect in 1995.14 The Rules allow specific instances
of conduct to be admitted as evidence of bad character in sexual
assault cases.15 A defendant charged with rape or child molestation
may be subjected in his trial to evidence of past convictions, charges,
or accusations of rape or child molestation. 16
As readers are presumably less familiar with the British system of
character evidence, a considerable overview is here appropriate. The
starting point is the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003, which pro-
vided that evidence of a defendant's bad character is admissible if:
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See FED. R. ExqD. 413-15.
15 In pertinent part, Rule 413 reads:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of
sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which is relevant.
Id. 413(a).
In pertinent part, Rule 414 reads:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of
child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another
offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
Id. 414(a).
In pertinent part, Rule 415 reads:
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated
on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual
assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and
may be considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
Id. 415(a).
16 Id. 413(a); 414(a).
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(a) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being
admissible,
(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in
answer to a question asked by him in cross-examination and
intended to elicit it,
(c) it is important explanatory evidence,
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defen-
dant and the prosecution,
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important
matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant,
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defen-
dant, or
(g) the defendant has made an attack on another person's charac-
ter.1
7
The law provides that a court must not admit evidence under sub-
sections (d) or (g) if, on motion by the defendant to exclude it, "it
appears to the court that the admission of the evidence would have
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the
court ought not to admit it."18 In short, ajudge must allow character
evidence admitted under theories (a), (b), (c), (e), or (f). However,
character evidence admissible under theories (d) or (g) must still pass
a secondary threshold of fairness. The standard provided, "such an
adverse effect.., that the court ought not ... admit it," is circular and
nebulous, seemingly allowing a judge considerable discretion in its
interpretation.
It is gateway (d), "relevant to an important matter in issue," that
represents the major change in the British jurisprudence. As the stan-
dard is less than exact, it requires further historical and contextual
explanation. Before the CJA and section 101(1)(d), DPP v. P9 was
the leading case law on bad character evidence. Under DPP, evidence
demonstrating that the defendant was guilty of another crime could
be admitted if its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice to
the defendant.20 This test served as an exception to section 1 of the
Criminal Evidence Act 1898, which established a general exclusionary
rule to the introduction of evidence of a defendant's bad character.2 1
17 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(1).
18 Id. § 101(3).
19 [1991] 2 A.C. 447 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
20 Id. at 461.
21 The Act reads, in pertinent part:
Every person charged with an offence ... shall be a competent witness
for the defence at every stage of the proceedings, whether the person so
20091 1347
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Section 101(1)(d) of the CJA turns the tables, so to speak. The
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), Britain's equivalent to the U.S.
Attorney's Office, explains, in seeking to focus the broad scope of sec-
tion 101(1) (d), that it must be read in conjunction with section 103.22
Section 103 provides that a "matter in issue" includes (1) whether a
defendant has a propensity to commit crimes of the kind with which
he is charged or (2) whether a defendant has a propensity to be
untruthful.23 Each of these will be addressed, respectively.
The policy on evidence regarding a defendant's propensity to
commit a crime is stated in section 103(1) (a), which provides that evi-
dence of bad character can be admitted to show that an accused has a
propensity to commit crimes "of the kind with which he is charged."24
According to the CPS, this phrase is understood to mean that evi-
dence of a defendant's bad character is admissible in two separate but
related situations: (1) if a defendant has a desire to commit a particular
crime, such as pedophilia,25 and (2) if a defendant has a habit of com-
mitting a certain kind of crime, such as child molestation.2 6 While
section 103(1) (a) contains the language, "except where his having
such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the.
offence,"2 7 this provision applies only to cases where there is no dis-
pute about the facts, and the case is decided on a question of law.28
Section 103(2) is a bit more specific, allowing the admission of
propensity evidence if the accused has either a previous conviction of
the exact type as that with which he is charged, 29 or if the previous
offense is "of the same category" as the one charged, as determined by
charged is charged solely or jointly with any other person. Provided as fol-
lows...
(f) A person in criminal proceedings who is called as a witness in the
proceedings shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer,
any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or
been charged with any offence other than one with which he is then charged
or is of bad character .... "
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1 (amended 2002).
22 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 103.
23 Id.; see also Crown Prosecution Service, Bad Character Evidence, http://www.
cps.gov.uk/legal/ato-c/bad-character_evidence/index.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2009) (outlining the scope of the "matter in issue" exception).
24 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 103(1) (a).
25 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 23 (describing the varieties of propen-
sity evidence).
26 Id.
27 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 103(1) (a).
28 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 23.
29 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 103(2) (a).
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the Secretary of State.30 As of this writing, two such categories-theft
offenses and sexual offenses on persons under sixteen-have been
created.31 This categorization presumably represents a parliamentary
determination that the types of crimes comprehended by the catego-
ries are sufficiently similar to warrant their grouping and that offend-
ers of these crimes are prone to recidivism.
As with propensity to commit crimes, propensity to be untruthful
is at issue in almost every criminal trial. Section 103(1) (b) provides
that the defendant's propensity for untruthfulness satisfies section
101(d)'s "matters in issue" requirement. 32 This is intended to enable
the admission of a limited range of evidence such as convictions for
perjury or other crimenfalsi offenses. 33 Another way in which this the-
ory could be utilized is to argue that a defendant's alibi is so similar as
one advanced by him on a previous occasion that it is unlikely to be
true. For example, if a defendant is twice accused of robbing a driver
at knife point, and he twice claims that he entered the taxi only after
the robbery, the previous alibi would be admitted in the subsequent
case.
In conclusion, at least in statutory language, the United States
and United Kingdom currently have evidentiary laws on bad character
that are nearly diametrically opposite. The difference is most glar-
ingly apparent when one focuses on the concept of propensity.
Whereas the U.S. laws take pains to ensure that evidence will not be
used against a defendant to show "action in conformity therewith,"3 4
the British system actively favors admitting evidence to prove that a
person has a propensity to commit a certain type of crime. It is there-
fore certain that the two legal systems operate under a philosophical
divide on the question of whether or not to introduce evidence of a
defendant's bad character. It is in this context that this Note will pro-
ceed to analyze which philosophical approach is more sound, and
which practical approach is actually in effect in the United States.
II. IN DEFENSE OF THE INCLUSIONARY APPROACH
Much of the scholarly research addressing the American exclu-
sionary approach to evidence of a defendant's bad character has
30 Id. § 103(2)(b); 4(b).
31 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 23.
32 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 103(1) (b).
33 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 23.
34 FED. R. EVID. 404.
20091 1349
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
focused on two possible justifications 35: (1) that character evidence is
irrelevant,3 6 and (2) that jurors may convict the defendant of the
charged crime in order to punish her for past crimes or will somehow
overvalue the significance of bad character evidence. 37 This Part will
address each justification in turn, debunking the notion that charac-
ter evidence is irrelevant before finding no additional compelling rea-
sons to restrict the admission of evidence of bad character. Finally,
this Part will address a foggier argument for the exclusion of character
evidence: the gauzy principle that the scales should be tilted as much
as possible in favor of a defendant; that as a society we have decided
that it is preferable to have guilty acquittals as opposed to innocent
convictions.
A. Character Evidence Is Relevant
The first consideration in this analysis is that potential prejudice
aside, propensity character evidence is highly relevant. Rule 401
defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."3 8 A brief example may be instructive. Suppose there is
a teenager in your neighborhood notorious for stealing hood orna-
ments from Jaguar automobiles. He keeps a sizeable collection over
his mantle and has taken to calling himself 'Jaguar." When you
return home one day from a walk in the park, you notice that your
Jaguar's hood ornament has been purloined. Does 'Jaguar's" charac-
35 For additional defenses used in favor of the U.S. rule, see generally Kenneth J.
Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547 (including the
defenses of fair notice to the defendant and avoidance of time consuming, distracting
collateral issues).
36 See, e.g., Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evi-
dence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV.
1003, 1041 (1984) ("[Sicientists question whether character evidence has any proba-
tive value at all.").
37 SeeJames Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 107 (1994) ("It is
self-evident that allowingjuries to learn of a defendant's prior criminal history ... will
increase the chances of convicting all those accused defendants who have been con-
victed (or at least accused) of sexual offenses in the past-regardless of whether those
defendants are guilty or innocent."). But see Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Report to the Attorney General on the Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 730-34 (1989) (rejecting common arguments that admitting
evidence of prior crimes creates prejudice).
38 FED. R. EvID. 401.
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ter, as evidenced by his prior acts of theft, make it more or less likely
that he stole your property? Of course it does.
The idea that one's character can be a useful predictor of his
future behavior seems so obvious as to not require much further anal-
ysis. Indeed, courts and scholars alike have acknowledged the rele-
vance of character evidence. 39 However, whether bad character
evidence is relevant is only the first line of inquiry as to whether it
should be admissible.
B. Character Evidence Will Not Be Overvalued
Rule 403, again, orders that even relevant evidence should be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice, including issue confusion, misleading the jury, or general
inefficiency and delay.40 Defenders of American character evidence
law would say that even if character evidence is relevant, it would
either be overvalued or used to punish defendants for past crimes.41
In spite of wide belief to the contrary, there is no good reason to
believe that juries will convict to punish past crimes. Legal authorities
have held that exclusion of character evidence is necessary to prevent
the jury from convicting based on the belief that the accused is a per-
son of bad character. 42 This stems from the fear that a jury will con-
vict an accused on the grounds of bad character without regard to the
rest of the evidence in the case.43 For example, the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note on Rule 404, which bans character evidence, provides that
character evidence is inappropriate because it "subtly permits the trier
of fact to ... punish the bad man because of [his] character[] despite
what the evidence in the case shows actually happened. '44
Were the fear founded thatjuries would improperly use evidence
of past crimes and convictions, its exclusion would almost certainly be
justified. However, a persuasive study by Professor Kenneth J. Melilli
39 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1998); Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-82 (1997); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the
Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the
Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 285, 289 (1995).
40 FED. R. EVID. 403.
41 See, e.g., Chris Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the
Racial Character of Rule 404(b) Evidence, 25 LAw & INEQ. 1, 48 (2007).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Turquitt, 557 F.2d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1977).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 981 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1346 (5th Cir. 1979).
44 FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note.
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of Albany Law School finds no such evidence of misuse.45 He does
not find that jurors will not be influenced by character evidence. Of
course they would, just as they would be influenced by DNA evidence
of witness identifications.46 But there is a large logical leap from the
proposition that jurors will weigh such evidence to the proposition
that they will value it disproportionately; that is, that it will be unfairly
prejudicial.
In fact, Melilli recognizes the idea thatjurors will "overvalue" pro-
pensity character evidence as internally inconsistent. Juries are the
backbone of America's criminal justice system, trusted as authoritative
finders of fact. If we are to trust that their "consensus of opinion is a
valid proxy for accuracy,"47 then we must accept that if a jury gives
propensity character evidence great weight in one case, then it neces-
sarily is deserving of that weight.48
Therefore, the overvaluation theory finds no support in the pro-
position that a juror exercises too much subjectivity in determining
character evidence's weight: this is the juror's very job. Instead, one
must believe that a jury would purposely come to a verdict based on
meting out punishment for a past offense. And there is no reason to
believe that a group ofjurors would conspire to act so nefariously as to
base their verdict on uncharged conduct. As Melilli states, "[t]he
notion that it is unfair to punish someone for something other than
the matter at issue is so straightforward ... that it is difficult to fathom
that an entire jury would agree to do just that .... ,,49 This fear also
rings hollow in light of the fact that character evidence is allowed in
the United States in some circumstances. For example, a defendant's
character may be impeached if he is a witness, or through cross-exami-
nation of his own witnesses.50 This suggests that if the unjust punish-
45 See Melilli, supra note 35, at 1606 (" [T] here is simply no empirical basis for the
speculative assertion that jurors will convict persons believed to be not guilty of the
charged crimes in order to impose sanctions for uncharged crimes. In fact, the most
that can be said in support of the unjust punishment hypothesis is that it 'has widely
been presumed' that jurors will convict as a sanction for uncharged misconduct."
(citations omitted) (quoting Duane, supra note 37, at 110)).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1598.
48 See id. at 1598 ("Now, if it is true that most jurors believe that the correct value
of character evidence is [x] . . .then the actual correct value of the character evi-
dences is [x], and there is no overvaluation whatsoever.").
49 Id. at 1607.
50 Rule 608 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in
the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
[VOL. 84:31352
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ment theory is valid, "then the well-established range of opportunities
for the prosecutor to deliver such apparently intoxicating information
to the jury under existing law makes no sense whatsoever."'51
Given the failure of these arguments to overcome the relevance
of propensity character evidence, it is logical to assume that what truly
motivates this concern is a more general distrust of juries; that strictly
controlling what comes into a trial is a way of controlling the jury
itself. This concern, it should be noted, is mostly American. At least
one British judge-working in a system that favors character evidence
admissibility-generally finds juries "incredibly educated and
informed" with respect to the relevance of character evidence. Even
when character evidence is admitted, jury verdicts are "remarkably
fair."52
Furthermore, Rule 403 is a sufficient safeguard against ineffi-
ciency and delay. A common defense of bad character exclusion is
that an inclusive system would require the defendant to be on trial for
any and all bad acts committed throughout his life. 5" If character evi-
dence enters a trial through prior bad acts evidence or by reputation
and opinion testimony, the defendant is forced to refute additional
charges, "inject[ing] an additional and confusing burden upon the
defense."5. 4 Also, admission of character evidence may reduce the effi-
ciency of a trial, raising costs and confusing the issues.55 In sum, this
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of
the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evi-
dence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness... may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if pro-
bative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examina-
tion of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified.
FED. R. EVID. 608.
51 Melilli, supra note 35, at 1608.
52 Interview with the Honorable Judge David Paget, Old Bailey Courthouse, in
London, Eng. (May 29, 2008) [hereinafter Interview].
53 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRArHPM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5232, at 346 (1978).
54 Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 1966).
55 22 WRIGHT & GRAHimv, supra note 53, at 346.
2009] 1353
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
pressure on the parties and the jury has the potential to "increas [e]
both injustice and inefficiency."56
However, such arguments possess a fatal error. If the exclusion
policy of Rule 404 did not exist, it would not be tantamount to blanket
admission of any and all character evidence. Indeed, such evidence,
like all otherwise admissible evidence, would still be subject to Rule
403's exclusion of prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or inefficient
evidence. 57 In other words, the exact concerns supposedly solved by
excluding character evidence are already adequately protected. With
Rule 403 in place, Rule 404 is at best a redundancy and at worst a
barrier against perfectly legitimate, probative evidence.
C. Guilty Acquittals v. Innocent Convictions
A final consideration that may account for the disparity between
the two systems relates to the axiom that it is better to see a certain
number of guilty men acquitted than it is to see an innocent man
imprisoned.58 If this consideration is indeed important, then an
exclusionary approach is certainly preferable. For example, a spate of
British miscarriages of acquittal related to terrorist bombing cases in
the 1980s and 1990s have been attributed to "a failure to disclose...
important character evidence. '59 However, a number of recent state-
ments and reforms show that this ideal is more axiomatic than
realistic.
In calling for the enactment of Rules 413-15, Senator Robert
Dole raised the troubling history of guilty persons acquitted because
of over-stringent evidentiary rules.60 And in introducing the CJA,
Prime Minister Tony Blair referred to it as "part of a major rebalanc-
ing of the criminal justice system in favour of the victim."6' Indeed,
56 James Landon, Character Evidence: Getting to the Root of the Problem Through Com-
parison, 24 Am. J. CRIM. L. 581, 595 (1997).
57 FED. R. EVID. 403.
58 English jurist William Blackstone first set the number at ten, saying, "[B]etter
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 4 WLLIAM BLAcK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Benjamin Franklin once said "[t]hat it is better a hun-
dred guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person should suffer."
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 9 THE WRIT-
INGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 291, 293 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1906).
59 Interview, supra note 52.
60 See infra Part IV.
61 Cindy S. Kui, Note, Right to an Impartial Jury: United Kingdom Parliament's Order
to Disclose Previous Convictions and Its Impact on Defendants, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 495, 513 (2006) (quoting Julie Hyland, Britain: Government Extends Attack on
Defendants' Rights, WORLD SOCIALIST, Oct. 28, 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/
2004/oct2004/jury-o28.shtml).
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the idea that a criminal justice system should be charged with pur-
posely erring to either guilt or innocence is flawed. Were this the
case, a system would strive to produce as many acquittals as possible,
thus obviating the system's very imperative.
Instead, a system should merely strive to admit relevant evidence,
while giving only secondary consideration at best to prosecutors' win-
loss records. For the reasons stated above, a system of inclusion can
best provide such a fair process. And at least one British judge has
gone on record stating that he does not believe that the CJA has led to
any more guilty pleas or convictions. 62
In sum, there is a very strong case that the justifications for the
United States' exclusionary approach to a defendant's bad character
are either chimerical or satisfied elsewhere in the legal system. First, it
is undisputed that character evidence is highly relevant. Moreover,
fears of vindictive or pliable juries are largely unfounded, and the
admissibility of character evidence for other specific purposes has not
borne out any of these fears. Finally, legitimate concerns about turn-
ing trials into free-for-alls with an accused forced to defend his whole
life are already solved by Rule 403. As such, an inclusive approach to a
defendant's character evidence is the better approach.
III. RULE 404(B): A MATTER OF CHARACTER
Although Part II suggests that the United Kingdom's inclusionary
scheme is preferable to the United States' exclusionary scheme, a
closer analysis of U.S. evidence law, particularly as related to Rule
404(b), reveals that the United States, in practice, does have a British-
style rule of inclusion. This Part aims to first track the Rule's history
and to discredit the notion that the Rule was intended to deal only
with issues outside the realm of character. It will then compare the
Rule to its British counterpart, by way of referring to each of the listed
categories encompassed by the Rule. In each instance the face of the
U.S. law would seem to militate toward the character evidence's exclu-
sion. However, the liberal interpretation of the Rule's language leads
to a result of inclusion.
It may initially seem puzzling that a discussion of Rule 404(b)
would occupy such a large portion, or any portion, of a Note relating
to character evidence. After all, the Rule begins with the explicit
admonishment, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith."63 In other words, a defendant's bad charac-
62 Interview, supra note 52.
63 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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ter evidence is not admissible as such. However, a review of the Rule's
history shows that abuse of this exclusionary principle is as old as the
principle itself. It contains, so to speak, more hole than target, and
works not to restrict the admission of evidence of bad character, but
to divert its path to admittance through loopholes and side doors.
A. Revisionist History: People v. Molineux and Its Aftermath
In the seminal case of People v. Molineux,64 Roland Molineux was
accused of fatally poisoning a Mrs. Adams. 65 Specifically, he was
accused of mailing her a bottle of medicine laced with cyanide. 66 Ear-
lier that year, a Mr. Barnet, who lived in the same building as Mrs.
Adams, had died when he ingested medicine he had received in the
mail to treat an upset stomach. 67 Believing these events to be more
than mere coincidence, the prosecutor for the Adams killer sought to
introduce evidence that showed Molineux was probably also responsi-
ble for the Barnet death. 68 Molineux was convicted. 69 Molineux
appealed, arguing that evidence of his alleged criminal history should
have been excluded. 70 The opinion behind his successful appeal
forms the basis of the modern Rule 404(b).
While Judge Werner authored the majority opinion, it is Judge
Alton Parker's special concurring opinion that forms the basis for the
modern law.71 He fashioned his standard in the form of a question,
asking, "Do the facts constituting the other crime actually tend to
establish one or several elements of the crime charged? If so, they
may be proved. ' 72 To be sure, this formulation is consistent with the
wording of 404(b), which nonexhaustively limits past-behavior evi-
dence to such criminal elements as motive, opportunity, intent, iden-
tity, etc.73 As such, 404(b) is not a betrayal of the Molineux principle.
However, Rule 404(b) represents only one of two possible inter-
pretations of Molineux. The other conforms to the British approach
to evidence of bad character. This approach allows past-behavior evi-
64 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
65 Id. at 287.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 290-93.
69 Id. at 287.
70 Id. at 293.
71 See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule
404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (2005).
72 Molineux, 61 N.E. at 314.
73 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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dence any time it relates to "an important matter in issue. ' 74 Again,
recall that this has been interpreted to allow past behavior as charac-
ter evidence any time it tends to show propensity to commit a certain
type of crime or to be untruthful.75 Whether one is telling the truth
about an alibi or whether the defendant in fact committed the crime
(the matters toward which character evidence are relevant in British
law) could certainly be considered "elements" of a crime pursuant to
Molineux to the same extent that motive, plan, and knowledge can.
In any case, the wording of Rule 404(b) unambiguously finished
the work of interpreting Molineux to exclude all character evidence. It
passed in 1975 as one of the least controversial Rules 76 and was not
the focus of much public commentary or legislative discussion. 77 The
transformation from an ambivalent decision to a steadfast rule was
seemingly complete.
However, at the time of its passing, Judge Friendly of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals asked presciently of the Rule:
"Does this ... allow[] evidence of other crimes except when offered
only to show the defendant is a bad man, or the rule requiring that
these crimes show some particular trait relevant to the charge? The
rule seems to walk both sides of the street. It will provide a bounti-
ful source of appeals and possible reversals ....,78
Indeed, and despite its uncontroversial passing, Rule 404(b) has been
the most contested Federal Rule of Evidence, giving rise to by far the
most appeals. 79 This can be attributed to its fuzzy determination of
whether and how it should be interpreted to admit character
evidence.
B. Practical Application of 404(b): Better than No Character
Evidence at All
During the era of Prohibition, a popular rallying cry was, "[It's]
better than no booze at all! 8 0 A similar phrase could describe
404(b)'s ban on character evidence. The irony in the law since Moli-
neux is that even as the statutory law has moved surely and steadily
74 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(1)(d).
75 Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 23.
76 Reed, supra note 71, at 209.
77 Id. at 209-10.
78 Id. at 210 (quoting Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal
Laws of the Comm. on the JudiciaTy, 93d Cong. 251-52 (1973) (statement ofJudge Henry
Friendly, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)).
79 Id. at 211.
80 Milton Shapp, Governor of Pa., Address to the National Governors Association
(Mar. 6, 1974).
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toward an interpretation disallowing character evidence, the case law
has diverged, favoring its inclusion even in the face of increasingly
imposing obstacles. While the language of Rule 404(b) makes clear
that it is nonexhaustive, 8a the following sections attempt to take each
of the listed situations in which past occurrences can be admitted and
show how they have served as mere gateways for the introduction of
propensity character evidence.
1. Knowledge
"Knowledge," for the purposes of Rule 404(b), is a "circumstan-
tial way to prove criminal intent, because if the defendant knows what
he or she is doing, then criminal intent to commit a crime follows
from that knowledge." 82 For example, presume that a man is arrested
and charged with possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute.
The man's defense is that he found the bags of marijuana in the new
desk he bought and he guessed that the bags contained oregano.
Under 404(b)'s knowledge exception, a prosecutor could probably
introduce evidence that the man had been seen smoking marijuana
on several previous occasions. In theory, this evidence would be intro-
duced to show that the man had knowledge that what he possessed
was marijuana. The problem, of course, is that there is no way to
excise evidence of the man's character of smoking marijuana from the
"knowledge" aspect of the evidence.
While the "knowledge" gateway is problematic enough in theory,
it has been even more flagrantly abused in real-life trials. Take, for
example, the case of United States v. Lopez.83 Defendant Lopez was in
81 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
82 Reed, supra note 71, at 218-19; see also United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363,
369 (5th Cir. 2003) (admitting evidence that the defendant participated in two prior
staged auto accidents to collect insurance proceeds to show that defendant knowingly
participated in the false staged accident described in indictment and to show general
criminal intent).
83 340 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2003). There are many examples of cases with similar
results on similar facts. See, e.g., United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460-62 (3d Cir.
2003) (allowing evidence of a prior conviction for cocaine trafficking to imply knowl-
edge of the physical appearance of heroin); United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256,
261-62 (3d Cir. 2002) (admitting evidence of a previous drug conspiracy conviction
that did not involve defendant coming into contact with illegal drugs to prove knowl-
edge of drugs' properties in a subsequent trial for drug conspiracy); United States v.
Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing evidence of a prior conviction
for importing small amounts of cocaine to imply knowledge of a large quantity of
marijuana); United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1991)
(allowing evidence of a prior conviction for cocaine trafficking to imply knowledge of
the appearance of marijuana). For a case taking an alternative approach, see United
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prison on a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute.8 4 While in jail, prison guards found twenty small bags of her-
oin in his cell.8 5 He was charged with drug possession with intent to
distribute. Lopez raised the defense of innocent association.8 6 At
issue on appeal was whether the district court was correct in permit-
ting evidence of his conviction for cocaine possession to prove knowl-
edge in the heroin trial.
In theory, British law should allow this evidence, whereas Ameri-
can law should not. Without much analysis needed, this case would
pass the British threshold of a person having a desire or habit to com-
mit a particular crime (drug distribution) under sections 101 (1) (d)
and 103(1) (a) of the CJA. However, this would not seem to be admis-
sible under U.S. law, which does not allow propensity evidence. As to
the 404(b) knowledge exception, it does not seem that a knowledge of
what cocaine looks like would have any bearing on whether one would
know the same about heroin.
However, the Third Circuit ruled that the past conviction was
admissible. In so doing, it did not adduce a single piece of analysis of
how one's prior association with cocaine would make him more likely
to acquire or identify heroin. Rather, it relied on the nebulous asser-
tion that it was the court's policy to "uphold[] the admission of evi-
dence of prior drug involvement for the purpose of rebutting defense
claims of innocent association. '8 7 If one rules out flagrant malprac-
tice from consideration, it follows that the Third Circuit's intent in
allowing a drug conviction to operate against a man on trial for pos-
session of another drug is to endorse the use of 404(b) for admission of
the information as character rather than knowledge evidence.
2. Identity
To introduce past-behavior evidence under the theory of "iden-
tity," a prosecutor must allege similar criminal conduct to prove that
the accused committed the crime.8 8 Most courts require more than
mere similarity; usually the crime must be so specifically unique as to
States v. Garcia-Orozco, 997 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding evidence of a
prior heroin possession irrelevant in implying knowledge of the appearance of
marijuana).
84 Lopez, 340 F.3d at 172.
85 Id. at 171.
86 Id. at 174.
87 Id.
88 Reed, supra note 71, at 234.
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constitute a criminal "signature."8 9 For example, suppose a man has
previously been known to devour two boxes of Cheerios during his
house robberies. If he is on trial for a robbery in which Cheerios bits
were found on the floor and two empty Cheerios boxes were found in
the trash, this evidence would presumably be allowed through the
404(b) identity gateway.
However, this gateway, too, has sometimes proved to be little
more than a conduit for the admission of propensity character evi-
dence. Take, for example, the case of United States v. Mack.90 In that
case, Mack was convicted of armed bank robbery.9 1 The Sixth Circuit
reviewed whether the prosecutor was rightfully allowed to admit evi-
dence of other charged bank robberies based on the fact that in both,
the defendant allegedly (1) wore a ski mask, (2) "burst into the bank,"
and leaped over the teller counter, and (3) leaped back over the teller
counter to leave. 92
Under British law this case would be open and shut. Under sec-
tion 103(4) (b) of the CJA, the Secretary of State has prescribed theft
as a categorical indicator that a defendant has a propensity to be a
repeat offender. As robbing a bank falls into this category, the defen-
dant's previous crimes would be admitted. Under U.S. law, this situa-
tion would seem to demand an opposite, though equally obvious,
result. Anyone who has ever watched a heist movie would know that
these three ways of robbing a bank are hackneyed and overplayed,
hardly unique enough to constitute a signature. The court itself
acknowledged that the elements "were not particularly unusual."93
89 See, e.g., State v. Long, 575 A.2d 435, 452-53 (N.J. 1990) (discussing the "signa-
ture" requirement).
90 258 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2001). There are many examples of similar identity
decisions on similarly generic facts. See, e.g., Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172
(9th Cir. 2005) (admitting evidence of a defendant's former robbery of a particular 7-
Eleven to prove identity in a subsequent murder of a clerk in the 7-Eleven); United
States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 1989) (admitting as evidence of identity
a home invasion where homeowner was bound with duct tape); United States v.
Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding defendants' conduct of wearing ski
masks, goggles, jumpsuits, and using a stolen vehicle for a getaway car established a
"signature" for the purposes of Rule 404(b)). For an alternative approach, see United
States v. Luna, 21 F.3d 874, 878-83 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding inadmissible evidence of a
former bank robbery where the common elements were the use of guns, masks,
gloves, bags, and profanity).
91 Mack, 258 F.3d at 551.
92 Id. at 553-54.
93 Id. at 554.
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Still, the Sixth Circuit held that the robberies were similar
enough to be admitted.94 Lest one think this is an isolated incident,
consider the case of United States v. Woods,95 in which the Sixth Circuit
admitted identity evidence for robbers who used the decidedly nonsig-
nature items of ski masks, goggles, jumpsuits, and, least shockingly, a
stolen automobile to commit their crime. 96 Again, any lay observer,
let alone a Sixth Circuit judge, could see that the similarity of an
aggressive bank robber is not the type of "identity" evidence envi-
sioned by Rule 404(b). The only conclusion to be drawn from cases
like this is that courts are reading the Rule broadly enough as to allow
in character evidence.
3. Motive
Motive is almost never an explicit element of a crime, but courts
have traditionally found that proof of motive is relevant to an issue of
guilt or innocence. 97 In order to have past-behavior evidence admit-
ted under the motive theory, a prosecutor can either introduce dis-
similar crimes to explain why the accused committed the crime
charged or admit similar crimes for the same purpose.98 For example,
a prosecutor could introduce evidence that a man had previously
attempted to rob a convenience store in a trial against him for an
attempted bank robbery, in order to show that the defendant was in
desperate need of money.
In a now familiar refrain, this gateway too has been abused for
the introduction of seemingly unrelated character evidence. In Miller
v. State,99 Miller was convicted of first-degree robbery. He appealed,
arguing that evidence of a cocaine trafficking scheme was improperly
94 Id.
95 613 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1980).
96 Id. at 635.
97 See Reed, supra note 71, at 217.
98 See, e.g., United States v. Claxton, 276 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting
evidence in a federal firearms violation case to show that accused's apartment con-
tained unlawful drugs because it was relevant to his motive for keeping a firearm).
99 866 P.2d 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994). There are many examples of cases with
similar results on similar facts of dissimilar crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda,
986 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1993) (admitting evidence that defendant had a twenty-
to thirty-dollar-a-day heroin habit to prove motive in prosecution for a bank robbery);
United States v. Fuller, 887 F.2d 144, 147 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing evidence of drug
paraphernalia seized at an apartment to prove motive in a charge of firearm viola-
tions); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1983) (allowing evidence of
crimes committed by members of a white supremacist group to prove motive in a
murder committed by a different member of the group).
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admitted. 00 The trial court judge had allowed evidence that three
codefendants had trafficked in and used cocaine because "'[i]t
defined the relationship between the parties at the time. It dealt with
motive ... ."'101 The connection, as stated by the majority opinion, is
that the robbery (as it provided income) was motivated by an overall
plan to "buy cocaine in Florida for resale in Alaska."10 2 This despite
the fact that "the plan to rob. . . was not even hatched until much of
the cocaine dealing and use had already occurred."10 3
Under Britain's inclusionary system, the cocaine trafficking
would be admitted under gateway 101 (c) as important explanatory
evidence. 10 4 According to section 102, "important explanatory evi-
dence" is evidence without which the court or jury would find it diffi-
cult to understand both other evidence in the case and the case as a
whole.' 0 5 Note that this is a lower standard than motive, which
requires a link to why a person committed a crime (in essence, a defi-
nition of the crime itself). In the British system, then, this evidence
would be admissible under the simple explanation that it defines how
the men know each other. In the United States, the timeline of events
would seem to argue against admittance. After all, if the cocaine
scheme had mostly concluded, it would not be able to establish why
the robbery was committed.
One wonders if the judge would have allowed in the evidence had
Miller's debts been owed for a child's school tuition, or United Way
donations. While the answer to that question is unknown, what is
known is that the court here found admissible the fact that Miller ille-
gally bought and sold cocaine as a motive for a robbery that did not
involve theft of cocaine or its subsequent purchase. This again seems
to be an attempt by the court to subvert the intent of 404(b) by using
its supposed character evidence barriers as entrances.
4. Entrapment
Entrapment is "a defense that accuses the law enforcement
authorities of originating the crime charged in the indictment against
100 Miller, 866 P.2d at 131. It should be noted that this case was tried under the
Alaska Rules of Evidence, as opposed to the Federal Rules of Evidence. However,
Alaska Rule 404(b) is an exact duplicate of Federal Rule 404(b).
101 Id. at 133 (emphasis added) (quoting the judge below).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(c).
105 Id. § 102.
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the accused."1 0 6 The heart of an entrapment defense is that the
defendant was not predisposed to commit a crime until pressed to do
so by the government. "To counteract that defense the prosecution is
entitled to place before the jury evidence tending to show predisposi-
tion."1 0 7 This seems the most nefarious of the 404(b) categories
because it by definition calls for propensity character evidence.
Consider the case of United States v. Crump.10 8 In this case, defen-
dant Crump was convicted of distributing phentermine HCL and
cocaine. 10 9 Crump claimed entrapment, that he only sold the under-
cover agent the substances under duress.11 0 The prosecution was
allowed to admit testimony from a Lisa Clark, who told the jury that
she had sex with Crump (a member of the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives) four or five times a year in exchange for drugs.1 11 Clark
did not allege that Crump ever sold her the drugs or that the transac-
tions were in any way similar to the one in which Crump was allegedly
entrapped.
Again, this evidence would seem to be admissible under British
law, with little question. The prosecution merely seeks to introduce
evidence that the defendant had dealt drugs before. As British law
admits propensity evidence, the issue of entrapment would not come
into play, and the previous crime would be admitted. And again, the
plain language of 404(b) would seem to exclude this evidence as it is
propensity evidence, plain and simple. In fact, the Crump court
asserted that it was the prosecution's burden to prove that Crump was
"predisposed to commit the crimes alleged."1 1 2
Despite this, the Eighth Circuit held that the distribution of drugs
aspect of the incidents made them "similar in kind," and thus admissi-
ble.11 3 As the two incidents were only tenuously related, the case can
reasonably be read as giving carte blanche to introduce bad character
evidence any time an entrapment defense is raised. Or, to quote the
106 Reed, supra note 71, at 224 (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
453-56 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring)).
107 United States v. Demetre, 464 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1972).
108 934 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1991). There are examples of cases with similar results
on similar facts. See, e.g., United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 739-41 (11th Cir.
1981) (allowing evidence of a defendant's former attempt to sell stolen tires to rebut
his defense of entrapment in selling stolen cars); Demetre, 464 F.2d at 1105-06
(allowing evidence of a defendant's prior interactions with a Secret Service informant
to rebut his claim of entrapment in a prosecution for forgery and counterfeiting).
109 Crump, 934 F.2d at 948.
110 Id. at 950.
111 Id. at 953-55.
112 Id. at 954.
113 Id.
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Crump court itself, "We have consistently held that prior bad act evi-
dence is admissible to show a defendant's predisposition once the
defendant has asserted the entrapment defense."" 14
These decisions evidence the crux of U.S. policy on propensity
character evidence. Based on the arguments in Part II, the evidence
in question should be admitted. But a literal reading of Rule 404(b)
would demand that the evidence be excluded. However, this Part
shows how three different federal courts of appeals and a state court
of appeals all adopted a different interpretation of Molineux, and thus
character evidence, than the statutory language of Rule 404(b). The
courts' propensities to follow the spirit of Rule 404(b) as opposed to
its language suggests that the United States has a practically inclusion-
ary, rather than exclusionary, approach to bad character evidence of
the accused. In these cases, in fact, there is no perceived difference
between using the U.S. system and the British, its supposed opposite.
IV. RULES 413-15: A TELLING EXPERIMENT
Even with all of the academic hand-wringing over Rule 404(b),
the consequences of its enactment might have forever inhabited the
world of the hypothetical. After all, for all its flaws, there was never a
way to know whether it was doing any more work to exclude character
evidence than would an ostensibly inclusionary rule. The hypotheti-
cal, however, became reality on September 13, 1994. On that day,
President Clinton signed into law Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415.115 These Rules allow specific instances of prior conduct to
be admissible as character evidence against the accused in sexual
114 Id.; see also United States v. Padilla, 869 F.2d 372, 380 (8th Cir. 1989) (consider-
ing that testimony that defendant had previously sold drugs was relevant and admissi-
ble for purposes of showing defendant's predisposition to traffic in drugs to refute
entrapment defense); United States v. French, 683 F.2d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 1982)
(regarding testimony that defendant had unlawfully purchased food stamps in Janu-
ary was relevant to the defendant's predisposition for doing likewise in June and July
to refute entrapment defense).
115 See Michael S. Ellis, Note, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 968 (1998). Rule 413 provides in pertinent
part: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
Rule 414 provides in pertinent part: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is
accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission
of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be consid-
ered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." Id. 414(a).
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assault cases. 1 16 This fundamental change offered a chance to
observe, side by side, an inclusionary U.S. approach to character evi-
dence with its exclusionary counterpart. This Part of the Note will
first chronicle the legislative history of these new rules, noting that
their unambiguous purpose was to admit character evidence in cer-
tain types of cases. Next, it will note the counterintuitive result that is,
largely, no result at all. That Rules 413-15 make so small a contribu-
tion to the default of 404(b) underscores the point that the system was
already one of inclusion.
During the early 1990s, several high-profile rape cases motivated
the public and Congress to implement stronger measures against that
particular societal scourge. 117 This goal coincided with an increased
female presence in the American political, military, and working
worlds.' 18 In response to this near-perfect storm, Congress passed the
Rules to show the public it was getting tough on sex crimes.' 19 Sena-
tor Robert Dole justified the new Rules like this:
[T]oo often, crucial evidentiary information is thrown out at trial
because of technical evidentiary rulings. This amendment is
designed to clarify the law and make clear what evidence is admissi-
ble, and what evidence is not admissible, in sex crime cases .... [I]f
we are really going to get tough, and if we are really going to try to
make certain that justice is provided for the victim ... [I] think we
ought to look seriously at [this amendment].' 20
The enactment of these Rules represents a clear effort on behalf of
the legislature to obviate procedural hindrance regarding an
accused's character evidence in sex crimes trials. In discovering signif-
icant overlap of Rules 413-15, whose interpretation cannot be
doubted, 404(b) is empirically exposed as a practical rule of inclusion.
In comparing the ways in which Rules 413-15 supposedly alter
Rule 404(b), one finds much more similarity than change. For exam-
ple, one argument for Rules 413-15 is that a person's desire to display
deviant sexual behavior in one case is akin to motive in another.12 '
Whatever dark instincts cause a rapist to abuse one child would also
116 Id. 413-15.
117 At that time, celebrities such as Kennedy cousin William Kennedy Smith and
the boxer, Mike Tyson, were imprisoned for and charged with rape. Smith was ulti-
mately acquitted, Tyson convicted. Ellis, supra note 115, at 974.
118 Id.
119 See Denis F. McLaughlin, Rule Changes Pending in Congress: The Shape of Things to
Come?, 143 NJ. LJ 683, 683 (1996).
120 Ellis, supra note 115, at 979 (alterations in original) (quoting 139 CONG. REC.
S15,072-77 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993)).
121 Melilli, supra note 35, at 1585.
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cause him to abuse another. The new Rules would seem unnecessary
for this purpose, however, as 404(b) has consistently been used to
allow would-be character evidence to prove motive.122 Another justifi-
cation for the new Rules is that the past behavior is necessary to prove
intent and absence of mistake. 123 A person previously accused of rape
would certainly not be mistaken as to the nature of consent in another
case. However, Lopez showed that the concept of intent can be
stretched far more than this under 404(b). 124 A third claim, based on
the so-called doctrine of chances, relates to identity. Simply put, a
rapist is more likely than a non-rapist to commit rape. 125 However, if
the act of rape is specific enough to be considered a signature (and
even if it is not),126 Rule 404(b) will have the evidence admitted that
way.
All told, many of the policy concerns heretofore cited for a switch
to an inclusionary system are concerns that had already been solved in
the United States' preexisting exclusionary scheme. This suggests that
despite the legislators' alarmism, the change they sought had been
enacted long ago, through the loophole-ridden 404(b), and the com-
mon law that was all too willing to exploit it.
V. EXCEPTIONS PROVING THE RULE
The liberal-in-practice nature of Rule 404(b) suggests a conclu-
sion that the United States' bottom-up and Britain's top-down
approaches have arrived at the same place; that comparing an exclu-
sionary system with exceptions to an inclusionary system with gateways
is akin to asking if a zebra is white with black stripes, or black with
white stripes. The thrust of this Note is that this is generally true.
This Part, though, will identify salient features of each system that pro-
duce differences in practice, as well as theory. However, it will con-
clude that the narrow circumstances in which the two systems do not
overlap are not sufficient to support the proposition that the U.S. rule
is fundamentally one of exclusion.
As previously noted, the British Secretary of State may prescribe
categories of offenses which are "of the same type" for use as an indi-
cator that a defendant has a propensity to commit offenses of a cer-
tain type. 127 One category so designated is the category of theft.
122 See supra Part III.B.3.
123 Melilli, supra note 35, at 1586.
124 See supra Part III.B.1.
125 Melilli, supra note 35, at 1586.
126 See supra Part III.B.2.
127 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 103 (4)(b).
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Therefore, any act of theft in a defendant's history will be admitted in
any other trial she is ever subject to relating to theft. While the liberal
reading of 404(b) makes a similar result likely in the United States, it
is not difficult to imagine a case where evidence would be excluded.
For example, imagine a case in which the prosecution moves to intro-
duce evidence that a man on trial for allegedly stabbing another man
to death in order to steal his wallet has previously been convicted of
burgling a pharmacy after closing time in order to procure a prohibi-
tively expensive medicine for his dying wife.
In Britain this evidence would be admitted. In the United States,
however, it seems even the most liberal reading of 404(b) would bar
the evidence. For example, the previous crime is not similar enough
to go toward identity, not joined enough by elements of the crime to
go toward evidence, does not explain the man's alleged motive, and
the defense of entrapment does not enter into play. Neither does it fit
into any of the other listed exceptions or otherwise prove anything
besides propensity character. Therefore, Britain's codification of this
policy determination means that character evidence for theft is more
likely to be used against an accused there than in the United States.
As previously stated, the United States has amended its eviden-
tiary laws to allow propensity character evidence in cases of sex crimes.
Even in Britain's nominal law of inclusion, a prosecutor would still
have to pass this evidence through a threshold burden of establishing
that it proves the defendant either has a desire to commit the particu-
lar crime, or a habit of committing a certain kind of crime. Say, for
example, a man is accused of imprisoning a woman in his home and
violently raping her at gunpoint. In his trial, suppose that a prosecu-
tor wishes to adduce evidence that several years prior, he was con-
victed of sexual assault for illegally touching another man's anus in
the "darkroom" of a nightclub. 128
In the United States, this evidence would be admitted under Rule
413. As both acts constitute sexual assault under the Rule, the previ-
ous conviction would be admitted for its bearing on any matter for
which it is relevant. In Britain, the evidence's admissibility would not
be so clear-cut. The prosecutor would either have to successfully
make the case that groping someone in a bathroom stems from the
same "desire" to rape a woman at gunpoint, or that the crimes are
close enough as to constitute a "habit."129 Owing to the peculiarities
128 This scenario would qualify as sexual assault for the purposes of the Rule. See
FED. R. EVID. 413(d) (2).
129 While not pertinent to this very discussion, it should be noted that sexual
assault on a person under the age of sixteen is the other section 103(4) (b) category,
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of the hypothetical, these arguments seem implausible. As seen in the
language of Rules 413-15, the United States has made a policy judg-
ment that Britain has not: namely, that once one has committed a sex
crime, he necessarily has a greater propensity to commit another.
CONCLUSION
This final analysis of the practical differences between the two
systems is a fitting way to conclude this Note. Because in analyzing the
two substantive differences, something is immediately apparent. Spe-
cifically, there are only two of them. It is shocking that between two
systems that have taken totally divergent paths toward evidence admis-
sion, a searching study yields only two major differences of what may
or may not be admitted. Further, in one of these cases, the United
States, with its ostensibly exclusionary system, is actually more
inclusive.
Therefore, what is left is that for all of the ideological differences,
it is harder to get propensity character evidence for theft admitted in
the United States than it is in the United Kingdom. Even in that spe-
cific case, though, it is important to note that Britain's system is more
inclusive because of a special exception made to their general rule.
Without theft being one of two cases designated as a special category
by the Secretary of State, this Note would yield the result that the U.S.
system was more inclusionary than Britain's, rather than vice versa.
This Note, however, should not be read as an indictment of the
hypocrisy of U.S. courts. Rather, it represents a triumph of common
sense in determining what should, or should not be, admissible evi-
dence in a criminal trial. Propensity character evidence is relevant,
and it is well within the ability of a jury to give it appropriate weight
and consideration. Therefore, it appears that U.S. courts, and espe-
cially courts of appeals, are interpreting Molineux through Rule
404(b) as a way to introduce character evidence when at all appropri-
ate. When compared to the inclusionary Rules 413-15 and especially
the British rules of evidence, it is seen that the U.S. courts are doing a
more than adequate job in providing juries sufficient evidence to
form their verdicts, and providing defendants the protections of a fair
trial.
along with theft. If this hypothetical concerned a minor, then, it would be admitted
just as readily under both systems. See Criminal Justice Act, § 103(4) (b); see also
Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 23 (describing how theft and sexual assault of
a minor under 16 are the two categories created by the Secretary of State).
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